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Abstract
We use a new data set to study the determinants of the performance of open-end
actively managed equity mutual funds in 27 countries. We ﬁnd that mutual funds
underperform the market overall. The results show important diﬀerences in the deter-
minants of fund performance in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world. The U.S. evidence
of diminishing returns to scale is not an universal truth as the performance of funds
located outside the U.S. and funds that invest overseas is not negatively aﬀected by
scale. Our ﬁndings suggest that the adverse scale eﬀects in the U.S. are related to liq-
uidity constraints faced by funds that, by virtue of their style, have to invest in small
and domestic stocks. Country characteristics also explain fund performance. Funds lo-
cated in countries with liquid stock markets and strong legal institutions display better
performance.
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1. Introduction
Mutual funds have come to play a dramatically increased role in ﬁnancial markets in recent
decades. As of the end of 2007, the world mutual fund industry managed ﬁnancial assets
exceeding $26 trillion (including over $12 trillion in stocks), more than four times the $6
trillion of assets managed at the end of 1996 (Investment Company Institute (2008)). The
number of mutual funds has also grown dramatically, to more than 66,000 funds worldwide
at the end of 2007 (including nearly 27,000 equity funds). Although the growth of the mutual
fund industry started in the U.S., where the industry plays an extremely important role in
ﬁnancial markets, this trend has spread more recently to other countries around the world
(Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005)). The share of assets under management outside the
U.S. grew from 38% in 1997 to 54% in 2007.
Investors are increasingly interested in mutual fund selection, demanding detailed mutual
fund information and investment advice. Many authors have tried to explain the performance
of mutual funds, which is a critical aspect in investor fund selection. Several fund charac-
teristics have been analyzed as potential determinants of future fund performance, including
fund size, age, fees and expenses, loads, turnover, ﬂows, and returns.1 Most authors conclude
that mutual funds underperform the market, but some others ﬁnd that managers display
some skill. In particular, there is evidence of short-term persistence in funds’ performance
and that money ﬂows to past good performers. Investors display some fund selection ability
as they tend to invest in funds with subsequent good performance (“smart money” eﬀect).
There is also evidence that fund performance worsens with fund size (Chen, Hong, Huang,
and Kubik (2004)) and fees (Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009)). Although the literature fo-
cuses on the U.S. mutual fund industry, several authors study fund performance in individual
countries. Few, however, examine cross-country mutual fund performance.2
1See, for example, Jensen (1968), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Ippolito (1989), Hendricks, Patel, and
Zeckhauser (1993), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Chevalier
and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Zheng (1999).
2See, for example, studies on Australia by Bird, Chin, and McCrae (1983); France by Dermine and
Roller (1992); Italy by Panetta and Cesari (2002); Japan by Cai, Chan, and Yamada (1997); Sweden by
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We study how the performance of equity mutual funds relates to fund characteristics
and country characteristics around the world. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
ﬁrst to study mutual fund performance using a worldwide sample of funds. The sample
consists of 16,316 open-end actively managed equity funds in 27 countries over 1997-2007.
We focus on the sample of funds that invest in their local market (domestic funds), but
we also perform some tests using funds that invest outside their local market or globally
(international funds). We use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to measure risk-adjusted
performance, but we also consider several alternatives including benchmark-adjusted returns,
market-adjusted returns, and the market model.
We study fund performance using an extensive list of fund characteristics, including fund
and family size, age, fees and expenses, front-end and back-end loads, ﬂows, past returns,
management structure, and number of countries where a fund is sold. There are reasons to
believe that there are important diﬀerences in the determinants of mutual fund performance
between the U.S. and the rest of the world. U.S. funds are much larger than elsewhere
in the world, and the U.S. fund industry is older and more developed. Our worldwide
sample of mutual funds allows us to consider several country characteristics, such as economic
development, ﬁnancial development, quality of legal institutions and law enforcement, and
mutual fund industry structure, as potential determinants of performance.
We ﬁrst document that equity mutual funds around the world underperform on average
by 20 basis points per quarter after fees and controlling for the Fama and French (1992)
three factors and momentum. We ﬁnd evidence of important diﬀerences in the determinants
of mutual fund performance in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world. The most striking
diﬀerence is related to the eﬀects of scale. We ﬁnd that small funds perform better than
large only in the case of U.S. funds, as large non-U.S. funds perform better than smaller
funds. The negative size eﬀect in the U.S. is economically signiﬁcant, as a one-standard
Dahlquist, Engström, and Söderlind (2000); or the U.K. by Blake and Timmermann (1998). Grunbichler and
Pleschiutschnig (1999) and Otten and Bams (2002) study European equity mutual funds, but their ﬁndings
on performance are narrow because of both a small number of countries and funds.
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deviation increase in fund size yields a 15 basis point decline in the next quarter’s fund
return. The positive size eﬀect outside the U.S. is also sizable. A one-standard deviation
increase in fund size is associated with an increase in next quarter’s fund net return of 11
basis points. Additionally, fund size does not seem to hurt the performance of funds that
invest overseas. We conclude that the U.S. evidence on diseconomies of scale (Chen et al.
(2004)) is not a universal truth as non-U.S. funds and international funds do not seem to be
aﬀected by diminishing returns to scale.
Of course, U.S. funds are much larger on average than funds elsewhere in the world. The
average U.S. fund is more than ﬁve times larger than the average non-U.S. fund.3 This fact,
however, does not explain the asymmetric eﬀect of scale on performance as U.S. funds of
similar size to their non-U.S. counterparts also present a signiﬁcant negative relation between
performance and lagged fund size. Our ﬁndings suggest that liquidity constraints play an
important role in explaining the lack of scale-ability of fund investments as argued by Chen
et al. (2004), Pollet and Wilson (2008), and Yan (2008). U.S. funds that, by virtue of their
style, have to invest in small (and illiquid) stocks are the most aﬀected by scale, while this
is not the case for non-U.S. funds. Moreover, the performance of international funds is not
negatively aﬀected by scale even for those funds located in the U.S. It is important to note
that U.S. international funds’ average TNA is similar to the U.S. domestic funds’ average
TNA. This suggests that the availability of more investment opportunities in funds that
invest overseas mitigates the adverse scale eﬀects. In other words, international funds are
not restricted geographically in investment opportunities as a fund grows, while domestic
funds are restricted geographically.
These ﬁndings are informative about the relevance of the Berk and Green (2004) model
around the world. The Berk and Green (2004) model assumes that funds operate in a
decreasing return to scale environment, which means that fund ﬂows harm rather than
improve subsequent fund performance. Our ﬁndings that diminishing returns to scale may
3There are only nine non-U.S. funds among the top 100 domestic equity funds in terms of total net assets
(TNA) at the end of 2007 in our sample.
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not be present outside of the U.S. mutual fund industry suggest that fund ﬂows may not
eliminate performance persistence in the manner predicted by the Berk and Green (2004)
model.
We also consider the eﬀect of the size of the fund family on fund performance around the
world. Many funds belong to large fund families and some of these families manage funds in
several diﬀerent countries (examples of top fund families are American Funds, Barclays, Fi-
delity, and UBS). Controlling for fund size, we ﬁnd that fund performance actually improves
with the size of its fund family, as large fund families beneﬁt from substantial economies in
trading commissions and lending fees. Chen et al. (2004) ﬁnd similar evidence for U.S. funds.
We also test the hypothesis that organizational diseconomies, in particular hierarchy costs
(Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Stein (2002)), erode fund performance. Large organizations
with hierarchies are particularly ineﬃcient in processing soft information, which is pivotal in
the case of mutual funds, as managers may have a hard time convincing others to implement
their ideas. Consistent with this view, we ﬁnd evidence that solo-managed funds perform
better than team-managed funds in a worldwide sample of funds, which is consistent with
the U.S. evidence in Chen et al. (2004).
Other fund characteristics have a variety of eﬀects on performance. Fund age is negatively
related to fund performance in the sample of non-U.S. funds, but this relation is statistically
insigniﬁcant in the sample of U.S. funds. This indicates that younger funds are better able
to detect good investment opportunities outside the U.S. We also examine the eﬀects on
fund performance of past performance and ﬂows. We ﬁnd evidence of short-run persistence
in fund performance, but only in the case of U.S. funds. The evidence on persistence is
consistent with the U.S. evidence (e.g., Hendricks et al. (1993) and Grinblatt and Titman
(1994)). Investors outside the U.S. seem to have some ability to select funds, as money
ﬂows to funds with good future performance. We ﬁnd, however, that the “smart money”
eﬀect is statistically insigniﬁcant in the sample of U.S. funds. This is consistent with the
U.S. evidence in Sapp and Tiwari (2004) that the “smart money” eﬀect is explained by
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momentum.
A unique feature of our study is that we can investigate the eﬀect of country characteris-
tics on fund performance. We ﬁnd country characteristics to have predictive power beyond
fund characteristics. There is a strong positive relation between the performance of mutual
funds and a country’s level of ﬁnancial development. In particular, funds perform better
in countries with high trading activity and low trading costs. Finally, we ﬁnd that funds
domiciled in countries of common-law tradition perform better. Investor protection and law
enforcement have a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on fund performance. Our ﬁndings show
that country-level investor protection is a critical determinant of the performance of the mu-
tual fund industry across countries in addition to the size and fees of the industry (Khorana
et al. (2005) and Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2009)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
the performance benchmarks. In Section 3 we present our empirical ﬁndings. Section 4
concludes.
2. Data and Methodology
In this section, we ﬁrst describe our sample, then we describe the methods for computing
abnormal performance and ﬁnally we present fund and country characteristics.
2.1 Sample Description
Data on equity mutual funds come from the Lipper Hindsight database, which covers many
countries worldwide in the 1997-2007 period. The database is survivorship bias-free, as it
includes data on both active and defunct funds. Although multiple share classes are listed
as separate funds in Lipper, they have the same holdings, the same manager, and the same
returns before expenses and loads. We eliminate multiple classes of the same fund to avoid
multiple counting of returns. We keep the share class that Lipper identiﬁes as the primary
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one. The initial sample includes 37,910 primary equity funds (both active and dead funds).4
We have checked the coverage of funds by Lipper with the aggregate statistics on mutual
funds (European Fund and Asset Management Association (2008), EFAMA). Total numbers
of equity funds reported by Lipper and the EFAMA are, respectively, 26,800 and 26,950 as of
December 2007. Total net assets of equity funds (sum of all share classes) reported by Lipper
and EFAMA are, respectively, $10.9 trillion and $12.5 trillion as of December 2007. Thus,
our initial sample of equity funds covers 87% of the total net assets of worldwide equity funds.
There is, however, some variation in coverage across countries. While Canada, Germany,
Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S. have coverages above 90%, the coverage in Australia and
France is roughly 60% and in Japan only 40%.5
We exclude oﬀ-shore funds (e.g., funds domiciled in Luxembourg or Dublin), closed-
end funds, index-tracking funds, exchange-traded funds, and funds-of-funds. This gives a
sample of 25,110 open-end actively managed equity funds from 34 countries. We require
mutual funds to have data on total net assets (TNA), age, total expense ratios, front-end
and back-end loads, ﬂows, management team, the number of countries a fund is sold, and
monthly total returns. We also require a fund to have at least two years of reported returns
because we need to estimate fund factor loadings based on past fund returns. The ﬁnal
sample includes 16,316 funds in 27 countries (12,577 active funds and 3,739 dead funds as
of December 2007). We believe this is the most comprehensive data set ever used to study
mutual fund performance in terms of both number of funds and countries. The data set
allows us to investigate the eﬀect of both fund characteristics and country characteristics on
performance.
The Lipper database provides information on a fund’s country of domicile and geographic
investment focus. We use these data to classify funds in terms of their geographic investment
4The primary fund is typically the class with the highest total net assets (TNA). The primary class
represents more than 80% of the total assets across all share classes.
5There are 24,050 equity funds with a TNA of $10.2 trillion in Lipper if we exclude closed-end and funds-
of-funds. In this case our initial sample covers 82% of the TNA of equity funds worldwide. The EFAMA
statistics are not entirely consistent across countries whether or not they include these type of funds.
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style: domestic funds (i.e., funds that invest in their domicile country) and international
funds (i.e., funds that invest in countries or regions diﬀerent from the one where they are
domiciled, and funds that invest globally). We require a country to have more than ten
funds to be included in the sample. The ﬁnal sample covers 8,176 domestic funds and 8,140
international funds. Table A.1 in the Appendix lists the top three domestic and international
funds by TNA in each country as of 2007.
Table 1 presents the number and TNA of the sample of mutual funds by country as of
2007. TNA is given by the sum of all share classes when there are multiple share classes.
There are a total of 12,577 equity funds in the sample in 2007, managing $6.7 trillion of
assets. U.S. funds represent 67% of the sample in terms of TNA, but only 22% of the total
number of funds. Other countries with a large number of funds are Australia and Canada,
which account for 17% and 12% of the total number of funds.
A country’s weight in terms of number of funds is greater than its weight in terms of
fund size for all countries except the U.S., indicating that on average non-U.S. mutual funds
are much smaller than U.S. funds. The average fund in Europe is ﬁve times smaller than
the average U.S. fund. This is also the case in Asia, where the average fund is nearly 17
times smaller than in the U.S. Overall, non-U.S. funds are more than seven times smaller
than U.S. funds.
Table 1 also divides funds by geographic investment style. Domestic funds represent
about half of the sample in terms of the number of funds and 63% in terms of TNA. Domestic
funds are, on average, 1.6 times larger than international funds. The U.S. mutual fund
industry is heavily weighted toward domestic funds, as they account for more than 80% of
the number of the funds and more than 70% of the TNA in the U.S. International funds,
however are dominant in other countries like Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and
the U.K.. For example, international funds in Australia, Canada, and France represent,
respectively, 46%, 60%, and 76% of the number of funds and 39%, 42%, and 70% of the
TNA. We conclude that U.S. investors prefer mutual funds that invest mainly in domestic
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stocks, while non-U.S. investors exhibit less home bias as they invest a signiﬁcant part of
their stock portfolio in international funds.
2.2 Measuring Fund Performance
We estimate the mutual funds (risk-adjusted) performance using several benchmark models.
Fama and French (1992) propose a three-factor model that improves average CAPM pricing
errors by including size and book-to-market factors. Carhart (1997) proposes adding a factor
that captures the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum anomaly. The four-factor model
regression is given by:
 =  + 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 +  (1)
where  is the return in U.S. dollars of fund  in excess of the one-month U.S. Treasury-bill
in month ;  is the excess return in U.S. dollars on the market;  (small minus big)
is the average return on the small-capitalization portfolio minus the average return on the
large-capitalization portfolio;  (high minus low) is the diﬀerence in return between
the portfolio with high book-to-market stocks and the portfolio with low book-to-market
stocks; and  (momentum) is the diﬀerence in return between the portfolio with the
past-12-month winners and the portfolio with the past-12-month losers.
The benchmark model in equation (1) nests several alternative benchmark models. The
market model assumes 
1 = 2 = 3 = 0 and market-adjusted returns further assume
that 
0 = 1We also use benchmark-adjusted returns by taking the diﬀerence between the
fund return and its benchmark return as listed on Lipper. We present results using these
alternatives in the robustness section.
We construct the monthly benchmark factors for each individual country using all stocks
included in the Datastream/Worldscope database. The market return is computed using
the value-weighted average return in U.S. dollars of all stocks in each country in each month.
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To form the size and book-to-market equity portfolios, we follow the procedure described in
Fama and French (1992). For each country, the  and  factors from July of year 
through June of year +1 are calculated using six value-weighted portfolios formed at the end
of June of year  on the intersection of two size portfolios (market equity capitalization,)
and three book-to-market equity () portfolios. The size breakpoint is the median
market capitalization of each country as of the end of June of year . Half of the ﬁrms are
classiﬁed as small market capitalization and the other half as big market capitalization. For
the  classiﬁcation, the breakpoints are the 30th and 70th percentiles of 
in each country for the ﬁscal year end in  − 1. The bottom 30% is designated as the
value portfolio, the middle 40% as the neutral portfolio, and the highest 30% as the growth
portfolio.
The  factor is the monthly average return of the three small portfolios minus the
average return of the three big portfolios:
 = (  +   +   (2)
−  −  − )3
The  factor is the monthly average return of the two value portfolios minus the
monthly average return of the two growth portfolios:
 = (  +  −  − )2 (3)
Table A.2 in the Appendix presents the average and standard deviation of the benchmark
factors by country.
The momentum factor () for month  is calculated using six value-weighted port-
folios formed at the end of month  − 1, as a result of the intersections of two portfolios
formed on size () and three portfolios formed on prior (2-12) month returns. The 
breakpoint is the median market equity in each country as of the end of month −1. For the
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return classiﬁcation, the 30th and 70th percentiles of the prior returns (2-12) in each coun-
try are the breakpoints. The bottom 30% are designated as the down month prior return
portfolio, the middle 40% as medium, and the highest 30% as up. The  factor is the
monthly average return on the two high-prior return portfolios minus the monthly average
return on the two low-prior return portfolios:
 = ( + −   − )2 (4)
We use monthly fund returns (net of expenses) denominated in U.S. dollars from July 1997
through December 2007 to estimate the factor models.6 We also present results using gross
returns in the robustness analysis. First, we estimate the time series regression of the monthly
fund excess returns on the factor portfolios’ returns using the previous 36 months of data,
every quarter (we require a minimum of 24 months of return data).7 We then subtract the
expected return from the realized fund return to estimate the fund abnormal return in each
quarter, or alpha, which is measured as a sum of an intercept of the model and the residual as
in Carhart (1997). Alpha measures the manager’s contribution to performance due to stock
selection or market timing. A positive (negative) alpha indicates that the fund overperforms
(underperforms) the benchmark. Since we use three years of return data to estimate the
factor model, our ﬁrst estimate of a fund’s alpha is for the ﬁrst quarter of 2000.
Table 2 presents the average factor loadings for domestic funds by country and the as-
sociated 2 statistics from these regressions. We see that U.S. funds, on average, load more
on SMB, HML and MOM than non-U.S. funds. So, U.S. funds play more small, value,
and momentum stocks than non-U.S. funds.8 It is well known that the four factor model
works well in explaining the variation in U.S. mutual fund performance and our ﬁnding of
6Our primary ﬁndings are not aﬀected when we use fund returns in local currency.
7There is look-ahead bias in our sample due to the exclusion of new funds that do not have enough history
for the regression analysis (see Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992)).
8The comparatively high loading on  for U.S. mutual funds might be explained by the historically
poor performance of the size factor outside the U.S. Indeed, across the countries in our sample the average
fund loadings on  across countries appear to line up with the magnitude of the average size premia.
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an average 2 statistic for U.S. funds of 85% bears this out. Even though the four-factor
model was developed on U.S. data, its 2 outside the U.S. is even higher, at 88%. This
reassures us that the 4-factor model is an appropriate way to evaluate fund performance for
our worldwide sample.
2.3 Fund Characteristics
Table 3 reports averages of mutual fund returns and alphas for domestic funds by country.
We winsorize returns and alphas at the bottom and top 1% level. The average fund return
is 3.01% per quarter. We report average Carhart four-factor alphas. The fund alphas are
negative for about half of the countries. The countries with the best performance are Den-
mark, Thailand, and Portugal, while the countries with the worst performance are Norway,
Australia, and France. U.S. funds are in the middle of the pack with an average alpha of
-0.30% per quarter, which is consistent with the average alpha in Chen et al. (2004) for U.S.
funds. Thus, there is evidence of underperformance in the worldwide mutual fund industry.
The average alpha is -0.20% per quarter with a standard deviation of 4.18%. Overall, the
ﬁgures here are consistent with other studies that ﬁnd that fund managers do not have the
ability to beat the market (or stay even with it) after fees (e.g., Malkiel (1995), Gruber
(1996)).
Table 3 also presents average fund characteristics by country. We winsorize the expense
ratio, total loads, and ﬂows at the bottom and top 1% level. Panel A of Table A.3 in the
Appendix deﬁnes fund-level variables.
Fund size is measured by total net assets (TNA) in U.S. dollars. The U.S., the U.K., and
Germany have the largest funds, while Thailand and South Korea have the smallest funds.
U.S. funds have an average TNA of $949 million, followed by the U.K. with $471 million
and Germany with $418 million. Overall, the average TNA in our sample of funds is $558
million. Outside the U.S., the average TNA of funds is only $170 million.
We also examine the eﬀect on performance of the size of a fund’s family. Family size is
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measured as the sum of all equity funds under management by a particular company. We use
the parent management company to calculate total equity assets under management. In the
case of transnational fund companies we use the sum of all equity assets worldwide. Funds
domiciled in the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Germany, Australia, and Canada are managed by
the largest fund families. Interestingly, the average family fund size of funds domiciled in
Poland and Taiwan is also quite high, despite low individual fund size. This happens because
funds in these two countries are part of large global fund families.
We use a host of other fund characteristics in our analysis of performance. The ﬁrst
characteristic is fund age as given by the fund launch date. The average fund age is about 11
years. Funds domiciled in Germany, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. tend to be among
the older ones. U.S. funds have an average age of 12.6 years.
The second characteristic is the total expense ratio, deﬁned as total annual expenses
as a fraction of TNA. In some countries where the expense ratio is not available we use
the management fee. The average expense ratio is 1.46%. Expenses vary considerably
across countries despite the global nature of the mutual fund industry. For example, average
expense ratios are the lowest in Belgium (1.05%) and the Netherlands (1.08%), while they
reach maximums of 3.25% in Poland and 2.68% in South Korea. U.S. funds present an
average expense ratio of 1.30%, which is slightly higher than the ratio reported in other
studies. The third characteristic is total loads deﬁned as the sum of front-end and back-end
loads. The average total load is 2.65%. Loads vary considerably across countries, U.S. funds
present total loads similar to the overall average.
The fourth characteristic of interest is ﬂows deﬁned as the percentage growth in total
assets under management (in local currency) between the beginning and the end of quarter
, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions):
 =
 − −1(1 +)
−1
(5)
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where  is total net assets in local currency of fund , and  is fund  return in local
currency. Funds have an average ﬂow of 0.44% per quarter. The ﬂows are positive in
the majority of the countries (exceptions include, for example, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
Switzerland).
The ﬁfth characteristic is the number of countries where a fund is sold. This variable
tells us where fund investors are located. While in some countries like the U.S., funds are
distributed only locally, in Europe it is common for a fund to be sold in more than in one
country. The average number of countries where a fund is sold is 1.1 for domestic funds, but
we can ﬁnd some countries where it is common that a fund is sold in several countries (e.g.,
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the U.K.).
Finally, we consider management structure as a potential determinant of fund perfor-
mance. Lipper provides a ﬁeld listing names of managers in charge of a fund. We use a
dummy variable (management team) that takes a value of one if the number of managers is
greater than one or the fund is listed as team-managed or by the name of the management
company, and zero if the fund is managed by a single manager. This variable identiﬁes the
organizational structure inﬂuencing the decision-making process of the fund, and it may help
to explain fund performance. Funds tend to be managed by teams in countries such as Aus-
tralia, Canada, France, and Japan. Management by teams is less common in Germany and
the U.K.. In the U.S., 63% of the funds are managed by teams (or more than one person),
which is consistent with ﬁgure reported in Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz (2010). Overall,
68% of the funds are managed by teams (or more than one person).
2.4 Country Characteristics
Our sample of equity mutual funds includes 27 countries. This large cross-section of coun-
tries allows us to examine the role of the fund’s domicile country characteristics in explaining
fund performance. To our knowledge, this feature is unique to our study of mutual fund per-
formance around the world. We use several country-level variables as explanatory variables
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that are classiﬁed into ﬁve groups: economic development; ﬁnancial development; investor
protection and quality of legal institutions; mutual fund industry development and concen-
tration. Table 4 reports averages for the country-level variables. Panel B of Table A.3 in
Appendix presents the country-level variables deﬁnitions.
We use gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita) in U.S. dollars from the
World Development Indicators (WDI) database as a measure of economic development. An
additional measure of economic development is the ratio between number of internet users
and the population of a particular country, taken from WDI. The intensity of internet usage
is likely to be higher in countries with better informed investors and more sophisticated
investors.
We use two proxies for level of stock market development and liquidity. First, the share
turnover ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of total value of stocks traded to market capitalization.
This variable is from the WDI database. The second variable is country-level trading costs
in basis points. We use the annual average transaction cost (including commissions, fees,
and price impact) from the Global Universe Data-ElkinsMcSherry database. Countries with
less developed markets are countries with higher trading costs (Malaysia, India, Thailand,
South Korea, and Taiwan), while more developed markets like the U.S. and Japan have lower
trading costs.
We consider three variables to proxy for investor protection and quality of legal institu-
tions. The ﬁrst proxy for investor protection is a dummy variable that equals one if the legal
origin is common law, and zero if the legal origin is civil law. Common law systems provide
better legal protection to investors than civil law systems (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)). In our sample we have nine countries with common law legal
origin (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the U.K., and the
U.S.). The second proxy is an index of minority shareholder protection (anti-director rights)
from Djankov, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). The ﬁnal variable is securi-
ties regulation, the combination of disclosure requirements, liability standards, and public
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enforcement from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006).
Finally, we use variables to proxy for the level of a country’s mutual fund industry
development and concentration. The level of development of the mutual fund industry is
proxied by the age of industry measured in number of years since the ﬁrst open-end fund was
sold in the country as reported in Khorana et al. (2005). To measure industry concentration
we use the Herﬁndahl Index, deﬁned as the sum of the squared market shares of portfolio
management companies for equity funds in each country. The Herﬁndahl Index is a common
indicator of the level of concentration within an industry. Higher values of the Herﬁndahl
Index indicate higher industry concentration. Concentration is higher in Indonesia, Portugal,
and Belgium, and lower in the U.K., Australia, Canada, France, and the U.S. We also use
the relative mutual fund industry size as proxied by equity assets under management scaled
by stock market capitalization (mutual fund equity/market capitalization) per country as an
additional explanatory variable. The data on equity assets under management are obtained
from EFAMA and stock market capitalizations are obtained from WDI.
3. Determinants of Fund Performance
We investigate the determinants of equity mutual fund performance. Following the large
majority of the mutual fund literature, we focus the analysis on domestic mutual funds, but
we also use international funds in some tests. We run separate regressions using U.S. and
non-U.S. funds that allow us to compare the determinants of the performance of funds in
the U.S. versus the rest of the world. All the regressions include time ﬁxed eﬀects (quarter
dummies) to account for cross-sectional dependence, and t-statistics are clustered at the
fund level to account for autocorrelation in fund performance. All explanatory variables are
lagged one-quarter.
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3.1 Fund Characteristics
Table 5 reports results of performance regressions using the Carhart four-factor model alphas
as a measure of risk-adjusted performance. Later, we use alternative measures of perfor-
mance. Column (1) presents estimates for U.S. funds. Column (2) presents estimates for
non-U.S. funds using fund characteristics and country dummies as regressors. Columns (3)-
(6) present estimates for non-U.S. funds using fund and country characteristics as regressors.
We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀects of fund characteristics and then of country characteristics.
Fund Size. Mutual fund size has been one of the most studied variables in mutual
fund research, and the relation between fund size and performance still puzzles academics
and practitioners. Several studies try to answer questions such as: Does fund size aﬀect
investors’ fund selection ability? Is management skill more pronounced when a fund is
small?
Large mutual funds present several advantages over small ones. First, larger funds are
able to spread ﬁxed expenses over a larger asset base, and have more resources for research.
Managers of large funds can beneﬁt from investment opportunities not available to smaller
funds. Large funds are able to negotiate better spreads, as they have larger positions and
trading volumes. Furthermore, brokerage commissions decline with the size of transactions
(Brennan and Hughes (1991)).
Large funds, however, face some problems and management challenges, and the scale-
ability of investments is a determinant of performance persistence (Gruber (1996) and Berk
and Green (2004)). While small funds can concentrate on a few investment positions, when
funds become large managers must continue to ﬁnd good investment opportunities, and the
eﬀect of managerial skill becomes diluted (diseconomies of scale). Cremers and Petajisto
(2009) show that small funds are more active, while a signiﬁcant fraction of large active
funds are close to index funds. Moreover, larger mutual fund managers must necessarily
trade larger volumes of stock, attracting the attention of other market participants and
therefore suﬀering higher price impact costs. Chen et al. (2004) name this eﬀect the liquidity
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constraints hypothesis.
Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Grinblatt and Titman (1994) ﬁnd mixed evidence on
the relationship between fund returns and fund size. More recently, Chen et al. (2004) ﬁnd
that fund returns decline with lagged fund size. The results is most pronounced among
funds that invest in small and illiquid stocks, suggesting that adverse scale eﬀects are related
to liquidity. They also suggest that in addition to liquidity, fund size erodes performance
because of organizational diseconomies. Pollet and Wilson (2008) ﬁnd that the cause of
diminishing returns to scale for mutual funds is the inability to scale an investment strategy
related to liquidity constraints as the fund grows. They ﬁnd that when a fund receives inﬂows
it tends to scale up its positions instead of diversifying into new assets. Edelen, Evans, and
Kadlec (2007) and Yan (2008) point out trading costs and liquidity as the primary source of
diseconomies of scale for U.S. funds. Outside the U.S., Dahlquist et al. (2000) ﬁnd that larger
equity funds tend to perform more poorly than smaller equity funds in Sweden. Overall,
evidence on the size-performance relation is not unanimous, but recent work seems to support
the presence of diseconomies of scale.
Column (1) of Table 5 shows that fund size (TNA) is negatively related to fund perfor-
mance in the sample of U.S. funds. The TNA coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant for U.S.
funds, -0.0675 with a t-statistic of -4.99. Thus, U.S. smaller funds perform better than larger
funds. Since the standard deviation of TNA (log) is 2.20, a one-standard deviation increase
to fund size is associated with a decline in performance of 15 basis points per quarter (60
basis points per year). These eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant if we take into consideration
the average fund performance is near zero. This estimate of the diseconomies of scale to U.S.
funds is very close to the one reported in Chen et al. (2004).
There are reasons to believe that the result might be diﬀerent outside the U.S., because of
the diﬀerence in size between U.S. funds and non-U.S. Indeed, the average fund is much bigger
in the U.S. than outside the U.S., as we have documented earlier. The results in column
(2) support a very diﬀerent relation between performance and TNA for non-U.S. funds.
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Fund size has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect (the coeﬃcient is 0.0517 with a t-statistic of
4.58) on performance in the sample of non-U.S. funds. A one-standard deviation increase
in fund size is associated with an increase in abnormal performance of 11 basis points per
quarter (44 basis points per year). Larger non-U.S. funds seem to have better risk-adjusted
performance than smaller funds. We further explore the reasons behind this asymmetry on
the relation between fund performance and size in the next subsection. In particular, we
test the hypothesis that economies of scale are exhausted after a fund approaches a certain
size in fund assets, as U.S. funds are much bigger than non-U.S. funds.
Fund Family Size. Economies of scale and scope can exist at the fund family level.
Expenses like research and administrative expenses can be shared among funds. Larger fund
families can use the same economic data and experts to interpret data across many funds,
leading to economies of scope and higher returns. Large fund families also beneﬁt from
economies of scale from trading commissions and lending fees (Chen et al. (2004)). Khorana
and Servaes (1999) in studying mutual fund starts ﬁnd that large families and families that
have more experience in opening funds in the past are more likely to open new funds. This
is likely to happen because the cost of generating a new fund is lower for large companies, as
they can beneﬁt from economies of scale and scope. Chen et al. (2004) ﬁnd that fund family
size has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on performance, which they ascribe to
family size capturing economies of scale.9
We ﬁnd that fund family size has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on performance in the
U.S. and elsewhere in the world (see Table 5). Funds that perform better are more likely
to be managed by a larger company as family size has a positive eﬀect on fund abnormal
performance. The eﬀect of family size is statistically and economically signiﬁcant, and it is
of similar magnitude in the U.S. and outside the U.S. Since the standard deviation of family
TNA (log) is 2.51, a one-standard deviation increase in family size is associated with an
9Others suggest that larger families transfer performance from low-fee funds to high-fee funds, and they
are committed to create stars that generate inﬂows to the fund itself and to other funds in the family at the
expense of more poorly performing funds (Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) and Gaspar, Massa, and Matos
(2006)).
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improvement in performance of 8 basis points per quarter (32 basis points per year). This
estimate of the economies of scale in fund families is similar to the one reported in Chen et al.
(2004) for U.S. funds. We conclude that the positive eﬀect of family size on performance is
pervasive around the world.
Age. Fund age provides a measure of a fund’s longevity and its manager’s ability. The
eﬀect of age on performance can run in both directions. One might argue that younger
mutual funds will be more agile and committed to achieve better performance to survive.
On the other hand, youth may be a disadvantage, newer funds usually face higher costs
and suﬀer from lack of experience during the start-up period. Because of their small size,
newer mutual funds’ returns and ratings are also more vulnerable to manipulation. We
ﬁnd no relation between age and performance of U.S. mutual funds in column (1), which is
consistent with the evidence in Chen et al. (2004) and others. In contrast, we ﬁnd that newer
funds seem to perform better than older funds outside the U.S. Using the point estimate in
column (2), a one-standard deviation increase in fund age (log) is associated with a drop in
performance of 6 basis points per quarter (24 basis points per year) of non-U.S. funds.
Expenses. The relation between mutual fund returns and expenses (including manage-
ment fees) provides a test of the value of active management. Mutual fund fees can be seen
as the price that uninformed investors pay to managers to invest their money. Expenses
vary considerably around the world. Khorana et al. (2009) ﬁnd that large funds and families
charge lower fees, while funds distributed in more countries charge higher fees. Furthermore,
they ﬁnd that fees are negatively related to investor protection. Empirical evidence on the re-
lation between mutual fund performance and fees is mixed. In a sample of U.S. mutual funds,
some authors ﬁnd a negative relation of fees with net-fee performance (Carhart (1997)) and
even before-fee performance (Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009)), while others ﬁnd no relation-
ship between fees and performance (Chen et al. (2004)). Evidence for European funds also
seems to support a negative relation between fees and performance (Dahlquist et al. (2000)
and Otten and Bams (2002)). We ﬁnd a negative relation between the expense ratio and
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net-of-fees performance. This relation, however, is statistically insigniﬁcant for U.S. funds
and only signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations for non-U.S. funds. Thus, there is not consistent
evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant negative relation between fees and performance.
Loads. Besides the expense ratio, funds commonly charge a load when investors purchase
(front-end load) or sell (back-end load) shares of the fund. The main goal of the back-end load
is to discourage redemptions. By making redemptions expensive, a mutual fund dissuades
investors from redeeming shares, and it is able to invest in a more risky portfolio to enhance
performance. The empirical evidence conﬁrms that loads do dissuade redemptions in open-
ended funds, and that funds hold more cash when there is uncertainty about redemptions
(Chordia (1996)). Authors ﬁnd no relation between performance and loads (Chen et al.
(2004)) or a negative relation (Carhart (1997) and Pollet and Wilson (2008)). We do not
ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relation between performance and loads in our sample of U.S.
and non-U.S. funds.
Flows. According to the “smart money” hypothesis of Gruber (1996), investors can
detect skilled managers and direct their money to them. Therefore, fund ﬂows should have
a positive correlation with future returns. Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) show that funds
experiencing net inﬂows (in the last three months) perform signiﬁcantly better than funds
that experience outﬂows. However, Sapp and Tiwari (2004) argue that the “smart money”
eﬀect is explained by momentum. We ﬁnd no evidence of a signiﬁcant relation between
ﬂows and subsequent performance in the sample of U.S. funds. Since we are using the
Carhart model to measure performance, this is consistent with the Sapp and Tiwari (2004)
argument. In contrast, we ﬁnd that non-U.S. funds that receive more new money perform
better subsequently than those that receive less new money. Flows of the previous period
have a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, indicating a “smart money” eﬀect. Using the
speciﬁcation in column (2), a one-standard deviation increase in ﬂows is associated with an
improvement in subsequent performance of 20 basis points per quarter (80 basis points per
year). The evidence here supports the idea that investors are able to detect skilled fund
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managers outside the U.S.
How robust are our smart money ﬁndings outside the U.S.? First, it should be recognised
that as our performance measures are momentum adjusted in our smart money regressions
that these results are not attributable to stock-level momentum. Second, it might be argued
that serial correlation in ﬂows might inﬂate our t-statistics on lagged ﬂows thereby biasing
us towards accepting the existence of smart money outside the U.S. Ferson, Sarkissian,
and Simin (2003) show that autocorrelation in independent variables in return regressions
may lead to spurious inference when levels of ﬁrst order autocorrelation in the independent
variables are above 90% and when the 2 statistics in the regressions are less than 1%. For
our non-U.S. sample of funds, the average ﬁrst order autocorrelation of ﬂows across funds
is 0.25. In addition, the goodness of ﬁt statistics for our non-U.S. performance regressions
in Table 5 are approximately 5%. Adding these ﬁndings to the fact that the t-statistics on
lagged ﬂows in our performance regressions are extremely high (between 8.5 and 10) this
suggests that the incorrect inference problem suggested by Ferson et al. (2003) may not be
a problem in our dataset. Our subsequent smart money results using the Fama-MacBeth
approach for the non-U.S. sample below also add credence to this. As the time dimension is
essentially removed when using this technique, our ﬁndings that we still have smart money
eﬀect outside the U.S. when using approach suggest that our smart money ﬁndings are
not due to the persistence of ﬂows. Third, as we are controlling for lagged performance in
these smart money regressions, diﬀerences in performance persistence across countries do
not account for our ﬁndings.
Past Performance. There is ample evidence of performance persistence in U.S. mutual
funds (Hendricks et al. (1993), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995),
and Carhart (1997)). This persistence seems to be stronger among the most poorly perform-
ing funds. Outside the U.S., Dahlquist et al. (2000) do not ﬁnd performance persistence for
a sample of Swedish funds, and Otten and Bams (2002) ﬁnd performance persistence only
for U.K. funds. We ﬁnd evidence of persistence in U.S. funds. The eﬀect of past performance
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on future performance of U.S. funds is economically meaningful. A one-standard deviation
increase in past performance is associated with an increase in subsequent performance of 27
basis points per quarter in the sample of U.S. funds. Outside the U.S., persistence seems
to be much weaker or even inexistent (the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant in column (2) when the
regression includes country dummies).
Management Structure. While individual managers are free from group politics dif-
ﬁculties, teams of decision-makers have more resources and connections, which can help
to boost performance. Accordingly, funds managed by a team might perform better than
funds managed by an individual manager. On the other hand, small funds can easily be
run by a single manager, while a large fund usually cannot. Chen et al. (2004) suggest
that larger funds experience organizational diseconomies, especially hierarchy costs, as funds
deal mainly in soft-information. When a fund is co-managed, there is more competition to
implement an idea and managers may end up expending too much eﬀort to convince others
to implement their ideas than they would if they controlled their own funds (Aghion and
Tirole (1997) and Stein (2002)). Chen et al. (2004) provide some evidence that size erodes
fund performance because of the interaction of liquidity and organizational diseconomies of
scale. While team management may have become increasingly popular in the mutual fund
industry, U.S. evidence shows that team-managed funds perform either no diﬀerently from
(Bliss, Potter, and Schwarz (2008)) or more poorly (Chen et al. (2004) and Massa et al.
(2010)) than funds managed by a single manager. We ﬁnd that funds managed by teams
(or more than one individual) show signiﬁcantly worse performance than funds managed by
a single person. The diﬀerence in performance is also economically signiﬁcant at roughly 14
basis points for U.S. funds and 11 basis points for non-U.S. funds using the speciﬁcation in
column (2).
Number of Countries Where a Fund is Sold. We also analyze whether the number
of countries where a fund is sold helps to predict performance. There are two main reasons
why the number of countries where a fund is distributed can aﬀect performance. First, selling
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a fund in several countries should make the fund less sensitive to shocks in domestic ﬂows.
If investor ﬂows from diﬀerent countries are not perfectly correlated, distributing the fund
in several countries makes the fund less cash ﬂow volatile, reducing the cash position, and
enhancing performance. Second, it is well known that top-performing funds can originate
a substantial amount of inﬂows for a fund family (Nanda et al. (2004)). Therefore, fund
families are likely to make star funds available in more countries in order to gain market
share and increase revenues. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of number of countries where a fund
is sold is statistically insigniﬁcant for U.S. and non-U.S. funds (the eﬀect is only signiﬁcant
when we include country-level variables as regressors instead of country dummies). Thus,
there is weak evidence that funds distributed in several countries display better performance.
3.2 Country Characteristics
We do not know of any study so far to document the eﬀects of country characteristics on fund
performance. Our sample covering a large cross-section of countries allows estimation of the
speciﬁcations using country-level variables (Table 5, columns (3)-(6)). We do not include
U.S. funds in these regressions as they would represent a large fraction of the sample, but
we obtain similar results when we include them.
Economic Development. Economic development is associated with higher per capita
income and better education and skills, as well as with more developed industries and more
incentives for innovation and for new investments. Better ﬁnancially educated and more
sophisticated investors are likely to evaluate fund performance and follow it more closely,
exerting some pressure on management for performance. Furthermore, managers are likely
to be more skilled in more developed countries, as populations are better educated and
have access to more learning opportunities. Developed countries also tend to attract high
human capital individuals. Christoﬀersen and Sarkissian (2009) ﬁnd that managers located
in ﬁnancial centers in the U.S. display better performance. Therefore, a country’s level of
economic development might inﬂuence the performance of the mutual fund industry. We
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ﬁnd no evidence that a country’s level of economic development as measured by GDP per
capita is positively linked to fund performance. The relation is even negative and signiﬁcant
sometimes. We conclude that broad economic development is not positively associated with
the performance of domestic mutual funds once we control for other aspects of a country’s
level of development. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the intensity of internet usage has a positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that funds display better
performance in countries where investors are better informed and better educated and money
managers have better skills and greater access to learning opportunities.
Financial Development. A more developed ﬁnancial market can have some advantages
for fund performance because of higher liquidity and lower transaction costs. Trading costs
are important in evaluating fund performance as they provide valuable information about
the extent of deterioration in performance from active trading. Clearly, actively managed
funds involve substantially higher trading costs (Keim and Madhavan (1997)), and trading
costs are also related to fund size. As funds become larger, they will necessarily trade
larger volumes. Khorana et al. (2005) ﬁnd that trading costs have a negative impact on the
development of the mutual funds industry. We ﬁnd strong evidence of a positive relation
between trading activity and fund performance and a negative relation between trading costs
and fund performance. A one-standard deviation increase in share turnover is associated
with an improvement in performance of 38 basis points per quarter, while a one-standard
deviation reduction in trading costs is associated with an improvement in performance of 26
basis points per quarter. Thus, the evidence indicates that the liquidity of the local stock
market plays a prominent role in improving the performance of funds that invest in local
stocks.
Investor Protection and Quality of Legal Institutions. Diﬀerences in laws and
regulations can aﬀect investor behavior. Investors will be reluctant to invest in markets where
their rights are not properly protected. La Porta et al. (1997) note that countries with poor
investor protection have signiﬁcantly smaller debt and equity markets. They also observe
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that the quality of the legal system is important for the enforcement of contracts and also
captures the government’s general attitude toward business. Accordingly, we expect to ﬁnd
that mutual fund performance is positively related to investor protection and the quality of a
country’s legal institutions. We use three diﬀerent variables to proxy for investor protection
and the quality of legal institutions. We ﬁrst use a country’s legal origin, which has been
linked to the quality of legal institutions and investor protection. The common law dummy
variable has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in column (3). Thus, there is evidence that
domestic mutual funds perform better when investor protection is stronger. The eﬀect of legal
origin is economically strong. Funds domiciled in countries with a common law legal origin
outperform funds domiciled in countries with civil legal origin by 63 basis points per quarter.
In columns (4)-(6), we use the anti-director rights index and the securities regulation index
to capture other aspects of a country’s legal environment such as protection of minority
shareholder interests and the quality of securities market regulations. In every case, we
ﬁnd evidence of a positive eﬀect on fund performance. For example, an increase in the
number of shareholder protection mechanisms from three to ﬁve enhances fund performance
by approximately 60 basis points per quarter.
Mutual Fund Industry Development and Concentration. Mutual funds have been
one of the fastest growing types of ﬁnancial intermediary. This is a relatively recent trend
in a signiﬁcant number of countries vis-à-vis the U.S. The older the industry, the greater
the investors’ experience, and the more investment there will be in mutual funds (Khorana
et al. (2005)). Mutual fund managers will also be more experienced. We hypothesize that
the older the industry, the more eﬃcient the fund industry will be, and this may lead to
better performance. We do not ﬁnd empirical support for the hypothesis that older industries
display better performance. In a competitive industry, mutual fund ﬁrms might feel pressure
for their funds to perform well. One might also argue that in a more competitive industry
it is harder to achieve abnormal performance. We ﬁnd a positive relation between mutual
fund industry concentration and the performance of domestic funds. Overall, we do not ﬁnd
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evidence that industry development and lack of concentration enhance the performance of
domestic funds.
Finally, we take into account the size of the equity mutual fund industry relative to the
pool of underlying assets (proxied by equity assets under management scaled by stock market
capitalization per country). The coeﬃcient on the relative mutual fund industry size (mutual
fund equity/market capitalization) is negative and signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the
notion that in countries where the relative equity mutual fund industry size is greater there
are fewer unexploited arbitrage opportunities. It is worth noting that the coeﬃcient on
lagged fund TNA remains positive and signiﬁcant for non-U.S. funds after controlling for
relative equity mutual fund industry size. This indicates that a less competitive capital
allocation in the mutual fund industry is not responsible for the lack of diminishing returns
to scale outside of the U.S.
What do these ﬁndings tell us about how fund growth aﬀects fund performance outside
the U.S.? When funds increase in size, the impact of that growth on their performance
depends on a fund-level and an industry-level eﬀect. If funds grow at the expense of their
rivals so that relative industry size is unchanged, we need only worry about the fund-level
eﬀect. The coeﬃcient on individual fund size tells us that growth is likely to lead to improved
performance for small funds, and unlikely to do so for larger ones. However, if funds grow
by bringing new money into the fund sector, thus increasing relative fund industry size,
then the industry-level eﬀect will also come into play. In this case, the impact of their
growth on performance will depend on the relative magnitudes of the diminished arbitrage
opportunities (the industry-level eﬀect) versus the potential cost reductions from being a
larger fund (the fund-level eﬀect).
In summary, our research suggests that mutual fund performance is related to both fund
and country characteristics. There is evidence that funds from larger fund families and
solo-managed funds have higher risk-adjusted returns around the world. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the evidence for U.S. funds. There are, however, important distinctions
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between the determinants of performance in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world. There is
evidence of diseconomies of scale only in the U.S., while there is evidence of economies of
scale outside the U.S. We ﬁnd that the “smart money” eﬀect is only present outside the
U.S., while performance persistence is a characteristic speciﬁc the U.S. fund industry. In
terms of country characteristics, local stock market liquidity, investor protection and law
enforcement, and industry concentration have a positive eﬀect on the performance of funds
that invest in local stocks.
3.3 Why Are There Diseconomies of Scale in the U.S. Mutual Fund
Industry?
We have documented the existence of diseconomies of scale in the U.S. mutual fund industry,
while there is evidence of economies of scale outside the U.S. In this section, we aim to
understand the reasons behind this asymmetry. We leave other diﬀerences in terms of return
persistence and “smart money” eﬀect for future research.
We test two main hypothesis to explain the asymmetry in the relation between perfor-
mance and size between U.S. and non-U.S. domestic funds. A ﬁrst hypothesis comes from
the fact that U.S. funds are much larger than elsewhere in the world (the average U.S. do-
mestic fund is more than ﬁve times larger than the average non-U.S. domestic fund in our
sample; see Table 3). The diﬀerence in size between U.S. and non-U.S. domiciled funds is
striking if we look at the top 100 funds in terms of total net assets (TNA) at the end of 2007.
There are only nine non-U.S. funds among the top 100 domestic funds. The largest fund in
our sample is the American Growth Fund of America with a TNA of $194 billion, while the
largest non-U.S. fund is the Invesco Perpetual High Income with a TNA of $19 billion and
a rank of 26th.
We sort mutual funds in each quarter based on the quintile rankings of their TNA. We
perform the sort not only for domestic funds, but also for international funds as we use these
funds in this section to better understand the asymmetry between the U.S. and the rest of the
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world in terms of the relation between fund performance and size. Table 6 presents number
of funds and mean TNA for each fund size quintile separately for domestic funds (Panel A)
and international funds (Panel B) and within each of these groups separately for U.S. and
non-U.S. funds. Notice that the size quintile rankings are solely based on funds within each
subgroup (e.g., U.S. domestic funds). In each quarter, there are on average about 400 U.S.
and non-U.S. domestic funds in each fund size quintile. There is a substantial spread in TNA
between the bottom and top size quintiles. Domestic funds in the bottom quintile have an
average TNA of $13 million in the U.S., whereas the ones in the top quintile have an average
TNA of over $4 billion. There is also a signiﬁcant spread for non-U.S. domestic funds.
Funds in the bottom quintile have an average TNA of $2 million and in the top quintile
$726 million. We can also see that there is a dramatic diﬀerence between the average TNA
of U.S. and non-U.S. funds across all quintiles. The U.S. fund size quintiles have an average
TNA more than ﬁve times larger than the corresponding non-U.S. fund size quintiles. The
fund size quintiles of international funds in Panel B shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the average TNAs of domestic and international funds in the U.S. as well as outside the U.S.
Thus, domestic and international funds have comparable scale of operations.
A second hypothesis suggests that liquidity constraints play an important role in explain-
ing the lack of scale-ability of fund investments in the U.S. mutual fund industry (Chen et al.
(2004) and Pollet and Wilson (2008)). This hypothesis is supported by the fact that large
U.S. domestic funds that have to invest, by virtue of their style, in small (and illiquid) stocks
are the most aﬀected by scale, and the inability to scale an investment strategy as the fund
grows due liquidity constraints. This hypothesis is consistent with the arguments of Berk
and Green (2004) that small funds can concentrate on a few investment positions, but when
funds become large managers must continue to ﬁnd good investment opportunities, and the
eﬀect of managerial skill becomes diluted. We have documented that U.S. domestic funds
play more small (and illiquid) stock than funds located elsewhere in the world (see Table 2).
This could contributes to hurt performance as the scale of the fund increases. Thus, liquidity
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constraints are put forward as a plausible explanation to the diﬀerent relation between fund
performance and size in the U.S. and outside the U.S.
Table 7 presents the results of the regression tests similar to the ones in Table 5 but
designed to test our hypotheses. We focus the analysis on the fund size coeﬃcient, but
the regressions in Table 7 include the explanatory variables (coeﬃcients not shown) used
in Table 5. In columns (1)-(5) we test the hypothesis that the asymmetry is explained by
the fact that U.S. funds are much larger than non-U.S. funds. In columns (6) and (7) we
test the liquidity constraints hypothesis. Finally, in columns (8)-(9) we use the sample of
international funds as an experimental ground to test the hypotheses.
Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the samples of U.S. and non-U.S. domestic
funds excluding funds in the bottom fund size quintile. Therefore, we focus the analysis in
the subsamples of funds in fund size quintiles two through ﬁve. This subsample addresses the
concern that there is a systematic upward bias in the reported returns of small funds (e.g.,
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001)). This bias is potentially problematic for the analysis of the
relation between size and performance, especially given the U.S. evidence of diseconomies
of scale. In column (1) the coeﬃcient on TNA is negative and signiﬁcant in the sample of
U.S. funds, which is consistent with the evidence for the sample of all funds. In column (2)
we can see that the positive relation between fund performance and size outside the U.S.
is explained by the funds in the bottom fund size quintile. Indeed, there is an insigniﬁcant
relation between fund performance and size when we exclude the non-U.S. funds in the
bottom size quintile. It is important to note that even in this case we do not ﬁnd evidence
of diminishing returns to scale outside the U.S.
Columns (3)-(5) present results for the sample of U.S. domestic funds excluding the largest
funds. The goal is to evaluate the relation between performance and size for a sample of U.S.
funds that is comparable with non-U.S. funds in terms of size. We perform this test using
three alternative procedures. In column (3) we estimate the performance regression using a
subsample that excludes the funds in the top fund size quintile (i.e., subsample of funds in
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size quintiles one through four). In column (4) we estimate the performance regression using
a subsample that excludes funds in the top fund size quintile but with the TNA breakpoint
given by non-U.S. funds (i.e., subsample of funds with TNA below the TNA of the non-
U.S. funds in the top fund quintile). In column (5) we restrict the sample of U.S. funds to
only contain funds with TNA below the TNA of the largest non-U.S. fund in each quarter.
The results in columns (3)-(5) still show evidence of diseconomies of scale in the U.S. fund
industry. Thus, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that diseconomies of scale are
driven by the fact that U.S. funds are much larger than their non-U.S. counterparts.
In columns (6) and (7) we directly test the liquidity constraints hypothesis. We identify
funds in our sample that invest more in large stocks (large cap fund) and funds that invest
more in small stocks (small cap funds). We deﬁne a large cap fund dummy that takes the
value of one if a fund is below the median  factor loading, and takes the value of
zero if a fund is above the median  factor loading in each quarter. We deﬁne this
dummy separately for U.S. and non-U.S. funds. We augment the regressions speciﬁcation
by including the large cap fund dummy and an interaction term (TNA × Large cap fund)
that measures the diﬀerence between large cap and small cap funds in terms of the relation
between performance and TNA. The liquidity hypothesis predicts the sign of the interaction
term to be positive since in large cap funds there should be less of an adverse eﬀect of fund
size on performance than in small cap funds. The results in column (6) for U.S. funds support
this hypothesis as the interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant. The TNA coeﬃcient, which
registers the eﬀect of size on performance for small cap funds, is negative and signiﬁcant. In
column (7) we can see that there is not similar evidence in the sample of non-U.S. funds.
The interaction term is insigniﬁcant for non-U.S. funds as they load less in small stocks and
therefore they are not as aﬀected by liquidity constraints when they grow. We conclude
that the evidence from our worldwide sample of funds supports the liquidity constraints
hypothesis, which is consistent with the U.S. evidence in Chen et al. (2004).
It could be argued that the liquidity of U.S. small stocks might not be that low particularly
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when compared to the liquidity of the average stock from less liquid stock markets. How
does the liquidity of U.S. small stocks compare to average stock liquidity across the countries
in our sample? We address this question using two commonly used measures of liquidity
namely eﬀective spreads and share turnover.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (2001) (SEC) stock exchange liquidity report
presents eﬀective trading spreads for small-cap stocks that trade on the NYSE and Nasdaq
(deﬁned to have a market capitalization of less than $200 million) using data from June
2000 (the start of our sample period).10 The study reports that small-cap stocks have
eﬀective trading spreads of 0.85% for NYSE stocks and 1.67% for Nasdaq stocks. Jain
(2003) presents statistics on eﬀective trading spreads on stock markets around the world
estimated at approximately the same time in 2000. Based on these ﬁgures, in our sample of
countries, 15 countries have lower average eﬀective trading spreads than U.S. small stocks
traded on the NYSE and 26 countries have average eﬀective trading spreads lower than U.S.
small stocks traded on the Nasdaq. The countries with the higher average liquidity than
U.S. small cap stocks also turn out to be the countries with the largest fund management
industries. Even if we take the NYSE alone as our U.S. small stock liquidity benchmark, it
turns out that 88% of fund assets under management (based on Table 1) outside the U.S.
come from countries where average liquidity is higher than U.S. small stock liquidity, which
is explained by the fact that the largest fund industries outside the U.S. are also the most
liquid.
As a cross-check we also compare the share turnover per country used in our regressions
with the share turnover of U.S. small stocks. We again deﬁne “a small stock” as having a
market capitalization of less than $200 million following the SEC deﬁnition above. Using
CRSP share volume data, the average share turnover for U.S. small stocks during our sample
period (2000-2007) is 94% per year. Comparing this ﬁgure with our share turnover ﬁgures
10Eﬀective trading spreads are often argued to be more relevant than liquidity measures calculated from
quotes as they measure liquidity by calculating how far away transaction prices are from quoted mid-point
prices.
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for other countries in Table 4, we ﬁnd that 12 countries have average share turnover that is
higher than that of U.S. small stocks and that these 12 countries manage the majority of
assets under management outside the U.S. based on the TNA data presented in Table 1.
These liquidity comparisons suggest that a substantial number of countries in our sample
have higher liquidity than U.S. small stocks. These countries account for the lion’s share of
assets under management of the non-U.S. mutual fund industry. Although there are some
countries with lower liquidity than U.S. small stocks, these countries are the ones with the
smallest mutual fund industries.
We next test the hypotheses using as a laboratory international funds. These funds face a
diverse trading environment and investor clientele. In particular, liquidity constraints, which
seem to be the reason for diminishing returns to scale observed in U.S. domestic funds, are
likely to be less severe for international funds that can invest in a broader geographic region
(or even anywhere in the world in the case of global funds). One particular acute liquidity
constraint that can negatively aﬀect fund performance is the lack of new investment oppor-
tunities. When current investment opportunities have been fully exploited, fund managers
need to “go down their list” to the next-best stock (Pollet and Wilson (2008)). We argue
that this constraint is less severe in international funds. Thus, we expect to ﬁnd weaker
evidence of diseconomies of scale (or even no relation between fund performance and size) in
the sample of international funds. Furthermore, international funds can provide new insights
about the hypothesis that U.S. funds are too large. U.S. international funds’ average TNA
is similar to the average U.S. domestic funds’ TNA, and this also true across all fund size
quintiles (see Table 6). If the reason behind the diminishing returns to scale in U.S. domestic
funds is that they are too big, then we should also ﬁnd evidence of diminishing returns to
scale in U.S. international funds.
Columns (8) and (9) present the results of the international funds performance regressions
for U.S.-domiciled funds and non-U.S.-domiciled funds. To examine the determinants of the
performance of funds that invest overseas, we use both domestic and foreign benchmarks
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(Griﬃn (2002)). Thus, we expand the four-factor Carhart (1997) model to include foreign
,  and  factors. The foreign factors are value-weighted averages of all
countries’s factors excluding the fund domicile country.11
We ﬁnd that fund size is insigniﬁcantly related to performance in the sample of interna-
tional U.S. funds. In the sample of non-U.S. funds, fund size is also insigniﬁcantly related to
performance. This is an interesting ﬁnding since U.S. international funds size quintiles are
also similar to the ones of U.S. domestic funds (see Table 6). Furthermore, there are some
countries where international funds are as large as domestic funds or even larger on average
(e.g., the Netherlands). We therefore again conclude that the hypothesis that diminishing
returns to scale is due to the fact that U.S. domestic fund are too big is not supported by the
data. U.S. international fund are as big as their domestic counterparts and they do not face
diminishing returns to scale. Our ﬁndings suggest that U.S. international funds seem to face
less severe liquidity constraints, as managers have more investment opportunities available
as they can invest anywhere in the world. U.S. domestic funds by contrast seem to face more
severe liquidity constraints as they can invest only in domestic stocks. The diﬀerent relation
between fund size and performance for funds with diﬀerent geographic style supports the
idea that liquidity constraints play an important role in explaining the diseconomies of scale
in U.S. domestic mutual funds.
Our empirical ﬁndings are informative about the relevance of the Berk and Green (2004)
model around the world. The central mechanism in their model is the negative feedback loop
between past and future fund performance. Past performance aﬀects fund ﬂows as investors
chase performance, which aﬀects fund size. This change in fund size then adversely aﬀects
subsequent performance as the model assumes decreasing returns to scale. As we ﬁnd that
U.S. funds have decreasing returns to scale, we might expect the Berk and Green (2004)
mechanism to be relevant in the U.S. context.
11Alternatives to an international benchmark model include world factor model (factors are aggregated
across all countries), regional factors model (factors are aggregated by geographic regions), or only foreign
factors model. We obtain consistent results using these variations to adjust performance for risk.
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As regards the relevance of the model outside the U.S., our results demonstrate that
whether the Berk and Green (2004) mechanism fails or not depends on the origins of inﬂows
resulting from past fund performance. If inﬂows are the result of money being moved out
of other funds, then funds will get larger individually but (relative) industry size will be
unaﬀected. In this case, fund performance will not decline following ﬂows and may even
improve meaning that the Berk and Green (2004) mechanism will fail to work; favorable
past fund performance will not adversely aﬀect subsequent performance. However, if funds
grow by bringing new money into the fund sector increasing relative fund industry size,
then the impact of this on their performance will depend on the impact of fewer arbitrage
opportunities (the industry-level eﬀect) versus the potential cost reductions from being a
larger fund (the fund-level eﬀect). In this case, the relative magnitudes of these eﬀects will
determine if there are decreasing returns to scale and whether the Berk and Green (2004)
mechanism will fail to work or not.
3.4 Robustness Checks
We provide several robustness checks of our main ﬁndings. Table 8 reports the results of
robustness checks of the domestic funds performance regressions in Table 5. Columns (1)-
(5) present the results for U.S. funds and columns (6)-(11) present the results for non-U.S.
funds. We ﬁrst consider several alternative models to estimate abnormal performance in
columns (1) and (2) and columns (6) and (7). Here we use benchmark-adjusted returns,
and alphas estimated using the market model.12 The results are consistent with the results
using the Carhart four-factor model except for the “smart money” eﬀect in non-U.S. funds
that is no longer signiﬁcant. There is evidence of diseconomies of scale in U.S. funds, while
the performance of non-U.S. funds does not deteriorate with the size of the fund. Family
size, past performance, and number of countries sold are positively related to performance.
Management by teams negatively aﬀects fund performance.
12Results (untabulated) using market-adjusted returns are similar to those using market model alphas.
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Columns (3) and (8) report results of tests using before-fee performance (gross returns)
rather than after-fee performance. Monthly gross fund returns are calculated by adding back
expenses to net fund returns; we take the annual expense ratio and divide it by 12, and add
it to monthly returns during the year. The results are consistent with our primary ﬁndings
except for one notable diﬀerence. The relation between fees and before-fee performance is
now positive and signiﬁcant, while the relation between fees and after-fee performance is
negative. This suggests that higher-priced management, as measured by the expense ratio,
can generate higher gross returns, but returns are not high enough to cover the fees. Our
ﬁnding indicates that funds with higher fees are expected to have superior performance.
Thus, we do not conﬁrm the evidence in Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) for U.S. funds
using a worldwide sample of domestic funds.
Columns (4) and (9) report results using the Fama-MacBeth estimation procedure to
further address concerns on cross-sectional dependence. Columns (5) and (10) present esti-
mates including two lags of quarterly fund ﬂows and performance as explanatory variables to
address concerns that performance and ﬂows persistence could bias the coeﬃcients. Finally,
column (11) presents estimates with t-statistics clustered by country to address concerns
that residuals are correlated within a country. Overall, the results conﬁrm an asymmetric
relation between fund size and performance between the U.S. and elsewhere in the world.
There is also consistent evidence concerning return persistence and team-managed funds,
while there is no evidence of a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of fees on performance. Moreover,
there is evidence of a “smart money” eﬀect in non-U.S. funds, while this is not the case in
U.S. funds. In particular, diﬀerences in performance and ﬂows persistence between the U.S.
and elsewhere in the world do not explain the diﬀerences in the “smart money” eﬀect.
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4. Conclusion
This study investigates the determinants of mutual fund performance around the world using
a large sample of open-end actively managed equity funds in 27 countries over the 1997-2007
period. We ﬁnd that equity mutual funds around the world underperform the market. There
are common determinants of the performance of mutual funds in the U.S. and elsewhere in
the world, but there are also some important diﬀerences.
The U.S. evidence of diminishing returns to scale is not an universal truth. We ﬁnd that
fund size is negatively related to fund performance only in the sample of U.S. funds; for non-
U.S. funds, we ﬁnd that fund size is associated with better performance. The asymmetry
in the fund performance-size relation between U.S. and non-U.S. funds is not explained
by the fact that U.S. funds are too big vis-à-vis non-U.S. funds. The evidence supports
the hypothesis that liquidity constraints explain why U.S. domestic funds are aﬀected by
diminishing returns to scale. Indeed, U.S. funds that invest in small (and illiquid) stocks
are the most negatively aﬀected by scale, while this is not the case with non-U.S. funds.
Moreover, the performance of international funds does not deteriorate with scale, although
the scale of operations of these funds is similar to the one of domestic funds. We argue that
international funds are less aﬀected by a lack of new investment opportunities as the fund
grows, as they are not restricted to invest in their local market. We conclude that diminishing
returns to scale in the U.S. mutual fund industry are related to liquidity constraints faced
by funds that, by virtue of their style, have to invest in small and domestic stocks.
Other fund characteristics are also important in explaining performance. The eﬀects
of the organization of the mutual fund industry on performance are pervasive around the
world. Mutual funds managed by large fund families display superior performance and
therefore scale is not necessarily bad for performance. Solo-managed mutual funds tend to
perform better, which indicates that the possible beneﬁts associated with team-managed
funds are exceeded by the costs, in particular hierarchy costs associated with processing soft
information. Additionally, we ﬁnd evidence of short-run persistence in fund performance,
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but only in the sample of U.S. funds. Investors outside the U.S. seem to have some ability
to select funds, as money ﬂows to funds with good future performance, but this does not
hold true in the sample of U.S. funds.
Country characteristics are able to explain mutual fund performance beyond fund charac-
teristics. There is a positive relation between mutual fund performance and a country’s level
of ﬁnancial development, especially stock market liquidity. Furthermore, domestic funds
located in countries with stronger legal institutions, better investor protection, and more
rigorous law enforcement tend to perform better. We conclude that the home trading en-
vironment and the legal environment are important in explaining mutual fund performance
across countries.
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Table 1
Number and Size of Mutual Funds by Country
This table presents number of funds and total net assets (TNA) under management (sum of all share
classes in U.S. dollars millions) of the sample of funds by country at the end of 2007. The sample includes
open-end actively managed equity funds.
All Funds Domestic Funds International Funds
Country Number of TNA Number of TNA Number of TNA
Funds ($ million) Funds ($ million) Funds ($ million)
Australia 2,164 210,866 1,174 128,034 990 82,832
Austria 162 19,824 12 1,652 150 18,171
Belgium 184 28,917 19 3,170 165 25,746
Canada 1,491 410,546 594 237,924 897 172,623
Denmark 192 36,030 20 4,108 172 31,922
Finland 150 24,102 26 5,087 124 19,015
France 973 262,511 237 79,475 736 183,036
Germany 364 150,438 61 44,037 303 106,401
India 145 28,674 145 28,674
Indonesia 21 2,742 21 2,742
Ireland 79 21,606 79 21,606
Italy 274 75,783 51 14,049 223 61,734
Japan 662 69,676 430 41,586 232 28,090
Malaysia 158 6,177 158 6,177
Netherlands 151 62,133 25 10,277 126 51,856
Norway 126 29,412 48 9,700 78 19,712
Poland 20 10,542 20 10,542
Portugal 58 4,786 17 1,575 41 3,210
Singapore 210 17,474 12 1,513 198 15,961
South Korea 205 30,465 205 30,465
Spain 339 31,658 91 9,371 248 22,287
Sweden 242 110,093 99 56,107 143 53,985
Switzerland 190 44,443 58 20,234 132 24,209
Taiwan 217 16,487 161 11,852 56 4,635
Thailand 125 3,035 125 3,035
UK 934 519,649 384 277,166 550 242,484
US 2,741 4,533,223 2,216 3,216,470 525 1,316,753
Total 12,577 6,761,290 6,409 4,255,022 6,168 2,506,268
Total ex-US 9,836 2,228,067 4,193 1,038,553 5,643 1,189,515
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Table 2
Mutual Fund Factor Loadings and R-squared
This table reports means of quarterly factor loadings and 2 statistics from the Carhart four-factor model
estimated with three-years of monthly fund returns (denominated in U.S. dollars). The sample includes
open-end actively managed domestic equity funds. The sample period is from 2000 to 2007.  is the
excess return on the domestic market,  is the diﬀerence in return between the small and big portfolios,
 is the diﬀerence in return between the high and low book-to-market portfolios, and  is the
diﬀerence in return between last year’s winner and loser portfolios. Standard deviations across all funds
are in parentheses.
Country     2
Australia 0.95 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.86
Austria 1.07 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.83
Belgium 0.97 0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.90
Canada 0.93 0.13 0.05 -0.03 0.89
Denmark 0.89 0.14 0.02 -0.04 0.86
Finland 1.03 0.59 0.47 0.00 0.83
France 1.00 0.36 0.05 -0.03 0.85
Germany 0.98 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.92
India 0.90 0.31 -0.02 -0.03 0.86
Indonesia 0.76 -0.13 0.03 -0.01 0.78
Italy 1.07 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.96
Japan 1.00 0.15 -0.10 0.01 0.89
Malaysia 0.81 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.85
Netherlands 0.97 0.13 -0.01 -0.04 0.86
Norway 1.00 0.25 -0.01 -0.09 0.88
Poland 0.83 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.89
Portugal 0.95 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.92
Singapore 0.96 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.89
South Korea 0.89 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.86
Spain 0.96 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.92
Sweden 0.88 0.08 0.03 -0.04 0.92
Switzerland 1.08 0.24 0.14 -0.02 0.91
Taiwan 1.03 0.87 -0.41 0.06 0.74
Thailand 0.94 0.12 -0.03 0.05 0.94
UK 0.97 0.26 -0.04 -0.02 0.88
US 1.00 0.33 0.09 0.06 0.85
Total 0.98 0.26 0.05 0.03 0.87
(0.46) (0.43) (0.38) (1.06) (0.12)
Total ex-US 0.96 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.88
(0.19) (0.33) (0.25) (0.14) (0.10)
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Table 3
Mutual Fund Characteristics
This table reports means of fund characteristics. The sample includes open-end actively managed domestic equity funds. The sample period is from 2000 to 2007.
See Table A.3 in the Appendix for variable deﬁnitions. Standard deviations across all funds are in parentheses.
Country Obs. Return Alpha TNA Family Age Expense Total Flow Number of Manag.
(% quarter) Carhart ($ million) TNA (years) Ratio Load (% quarter) Countries Team
Model ($ million) (% year) (%) Sold
(% quarter)
Australia 2619 2.41 -1.29 123 22400 6.2 1.37 2.00 5.17 1.02 0.76
Austria 214 6.54 -0.31 58 8190 11.3 1.52 4.21 0.18 2.54 0.38
Belgium 546 4.92 0.75 89 8290 11.6 1.05 2.49 -1.38 2.32 0.92
Canada 5453 4.61 -0.58 265 19700 10.6 1.52 5.33 0.87 1.01 0.74
Denmark 410 5.82 1.36 138 5350 11.3 1.26 2.14 1.18 1.41 0.72
Finland 486 6.19 0.43 112 7990 8.5 1.58 1.97 2.78 1.40 0.58
France 7305 2.08 -1.36 158 9590 11.1 1.70 3.09 0.97 1.07 0.85
Germany 1733 3.46 -0.07 418 23000 17.5 1.24 4.45 -0.89 1.88 0.50
India 2101 12.24 0.57 38 13800 6.2 1.24 2.72 1.64 1.44 0.10
Indonesia 209 10.58 0.01 40 5710 7.6 1.78 2.86 13.40 1.05 0.05
Italy 1722 2.30 -0.20 282 17400 8.7 1.86 3.01 -1.20 1.00 0.92
Japan 10491 2.35 0.22 78 23200 7.9 1.38 2.32 -3.02 1.00 1.00
Malaysia 2633 4.72 0.34 40 2290 9.1 1.53 6.24 -2.02 1.06 0.61
Netherlands 474 3.93 -0.46 267 10100 11.3 1.08 2.03 -0.52 1.03 0.74
Norway 1181 6.94 -0.74 97 5710 9.8 1.61 2.85 -0.46 1.27 0.86
Poland 414 6.74 0.48 135 23200 5.4 3.25 4.25 12.77 1.00 0.78
Portugal 366 5.70 0.90 54 4400 7.1 1.93 2.53 -0.40 1.11 1.00
Singapore 270 5.57 0.11 45 6890 9.1 1.40 3.94 3.18 1.19 1.00
South Korea 6011 6.45 0.76 21 8520 4.5 2.68 0.05 -11.27 1.00 0.91
Spain 1979 5.31 -0.58 88 6300 9.3 1.97 0.77 0.00 1.01 0.81
Sweden 2358 4.62 -0.08 354 11500 11.0 1.33 0.79 1.41 1.08 0.77
Switzerland 1172 3.74 -0.29 271 12500 10.8 1.26 4.37 -1.22 1.63 0.51
Taiwan 984 5.38 -0.34 52 22700 8.8 1.55 2.72 6.42 1.00 0.00
Thailand 1989 7.32 0.92 11 968 8.3 1.37 1.20 -2.51 1.00 0.76
UK 6156 2.86 0.23 471 31000 16.0 1.46 4.21 0.27 1.75 0.23
US 58957 1.80 -0.30 949 44900 12.6 1.31 2.45 2.00 1.04 0.63
Total 118233 3.01 -0.20 558 30400 11.1 1.46 2.65 0.44 1.11 0.68
(9.93) (4.18) (2780) (90600) (10.60) (0.61) (2.63) (17.87) (0.61) (0.47)
Total ex-US 59276 4.21 -0.10 170 15900 9.6 1.62 2.85 -1.11 1.18 0.72
(10.49) (4.27) (514) (54600) (8.01) (0.68) (2.52) (17.89) (0.83) (0.45)
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Table 4
Country Characteristics
This table reports means of country characteristics. The sample period is from 2000 to 2007. See Table A.3 in the Appendix for variable deﬁnitions. Standard
deviations across all funds are in parentheses.
Country GDP Internet Share Trading Common Anti- Securit. Mutual fund Mutual fund Mutual fund
per (%) turnover costs law director regul. industry age industry equity/
capita ($) (%) (bp) (years) Herﬁndahl market cap.
Australia 34,672 69.8 78.0 32.3 1 4 2 42 0.05 0.33
Austria 33,882 46.8 36.1 30.6 0 3 1 49 0.07 0.21
Belgium 31,868 41.0 49.7 30.0 0 3 1 57 0.17 0.29
Canada 34,848 54.2 63.5 32.4 1 4 3 74 0.04 0.17
Denmark 34,319 50.3 82.2 34.0 0 4 2 43 0.09 0.14
Finland 33,187 51.9 128.6 42.2 0 4 1 18 0.09 0.07
France 29,412 35.7 83.1 28.4 0 4 2 40 0.04 0.21
Germany 29,006 41.1 137.0 27.1 0 4 1 55 0.13 0.11
India 3,523 4.4 110.5 65.6 1 5 2 41 0.08 0.02
Indonesia 4,315 7.0 46.6 71.7 0 4 2 10 0.26
Ireland 42,644 27.8 53.3 84.6 1 5 1 32 0.06
Italy 28,410 41.3 121.8 32.2 0 2 1 21 0.05 0.13
Japan 30,222 56.3 100.6 20.8 0 5 1 39 0.10 0.08
Malaysia 11,006 40.3 30.2 55.7 1 5 2 46 0.16
Netherlands 33,405 64.7 116.8 27.7 0 3 2 76 0.13 0.08
Norway 41,178 54.5 103.7 32.5 0 4 1 11 0.16 0.11
Poland 13,593 23.0 37.3 0 2 12 0.11 0.03
Portugal 21,183 26.5 53.1 33.2 0 3 2 19 0.19 0.04
Singapore 29,636 55.3 59.1 40.3 1 5 3 46 0.08
South Korea 21,417 64.0 216.1 57.3 0 5 2 35 0.09 0.04
Spain 26,473 29.8 167.0 32.2 0 5 1 46 0.09 0.10
Sweden 31,772 69.7 115.4 30.9 0 4 1 46 0.15 0.21
Switzerland 35,685 46.6 92.9 29.7 0 3 1 66 0.14 0.05
Taiwan 31,889 . 132.6 47.9 0 3 2 23 0.07
Thailand 8,445 10.1 85.2 59.6 1 4 2 10 0.11
UK 32,730 44.9 129.8 50.8 1 5 2 70 0.02 0.13
US 39,605 58.0 150.6 24.8 1 3 3 80 0.05 0.28
Total 27,716 42.9 95.6 40.6 0 4 2 41 0.10 0.13
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Table 5
Regression of Mutual Fund Performance
This table reports panel regressions of the performance of open-end actively managed domestic equity funds in
2000-2007. The dependent variable is the quarterly Carhart model alpha (percentage per quarter) estimated
using monthly fund returns in U.S. dollars. Explanatory variables include fund characteristics, time dummies,
and country dummies or country characteristics. See Table A.3 in the Appendix for variables deﬁnition. Robust
-statistics corrected for fund-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
U.S. Funds Non-U.S. Funds
TNA (log) -0.0675 0.0517 0.0221 0.0332 0.0230 0.0344
(-4.99) (4.58) (2.06) (2.90) (2.01) (3.04)
Family TNA (log) 0.0303 0.0275 0.0384 0.0360 0.0400 0.0388
(3.00) (2.64) (3.41) (3.19) (3.49) (3.45)
Age (log) -0.0020 -0.0825 -0.0531 -0.0677 -0.0550 -0.0742
(-0.06) (-2.64) (-1.62) (-2.08) (-1.65) (-2.29)
Expense ratio -0.1347 -0.0489 -0.0698 -0.0879 -0.1420 -0.1004
(-1.59) (-1.41) (-2.23) (-2.81) (-4.53) (-3.37)
Total load -0.0101 0.0120 0.0095 0.0284 0.0233 0.0177
(-1.25) (1.34) (1.10) (3.25) (2.70) (2.06)
Flow 0.0012 0.0111 0.0100 0.0103 0.0103 0.0101
(1.06) (9.76) (8.54) (8.78) (8.69) (8.47)
Alpha 0.0655 0.0105 0.0289 0.0295 0.0295 0.0279
(9.07) (1.58) (4.10) (4.21) (4.19) (3.95)
Management team -0.1373 -0.1027 0.0149 -0.0755 -0.0689 0.0222
(-3.40) (-2.36) (0.32) (-1.62) (-1.46) (0.47)
Number of countries sold 0.1636 0.0080 0.0486 0.0573 0.0622 0.0403
(1.80) (0.39) (1.95) (2.27) (2.44) (1.66)
GDP per capita (log) -0.2825 -0.4619 -0.4603 -0.1586
(-3.52) (-6.15) (-5.92) (-1.73)
Internet 0.0123 0.0154 0.0157 0.0152
(6.19) (7.71) (7.65) (7.42)
Share turnover 0.0055 0.0043 0.0056
(9.98) (7.54) (9.18)
Trading costs -0.0201
(-7.90)
Common law 0.5790
(7.45)
Anti-director rights 0.1558 0.2032
(4.86) (6.49)
Securities regulation 0.1293
(1.98)
Mutual fund ind. age (log) -0.0412 0.0466 0.1551 0.0297
(-0.55) (0.68) (2.32) (0.40)
Mutual fund ind. Herﬁndahl 5.2334 3.0447 3.1003 4.9513
(6.33) (4.26) (3.40) (6.39)
Mutual fund equity/market cap. -4.1843 -3.6300 -3.9263 -3.8257
(-11.71) (-10.00) (-10.73) (-11.11)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No Yes No No No No
Observations 58,957 59,276 53,191 53,191 52,777 52,777
2 0.103 0.048 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049
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Table 6
Distribution of Mutual Fund Size
This table reports the number of funds and the mean total net assets (TNA) under management in millions
of U.S. dollars in each fund size quintile. Fund size quintile 1 (5) has the smallest (largest) funds in
each quarter. Panel A reports the distribution of fund size for domestic funds and Panel B reports the
distribution of fund size for international funds. The sample period is from 2000 to 2007. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
Fund Size Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Domestic Funds
US Funds
Number of funds 392 393 393 393 393
TNA ($ millions) 13 57 152 436 4102
(9) (20) (51) (168) (7920)
Non-US Funds
Number of funds 395 395 395 395 396
TNA ($ millions) 2 11 32 96 726
(2) (6) (15) (47) (1010)
Panel B: International Funds
US Funds
Number of funds 95 96 96 96 96
TNA ($ millions) 18 66 176 495 4304
(14) (35) (101) (302) (7580)
Non-US Funds
Number of funds 649 649 649 649 650
TNA ($ millions) 4 17 44 110 615
(3) (7) (16) (41) (789)
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Table 7
Regression of Mutual Fund Performance: Role of Fund Size and Liquidity
This table reports panel regressions of the performance of open-end actively managed equity funds in 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the
quarterly Carhart model alpha (percentage per quarter) estimated using monthly fund returns in U.S. dollars. Explanatory variables include fund
characteristics, time dummies, and country dummies. Regressions include the same fund characteristics (coeﬃcients not shown) used in Table 5.
Columns (1) and (2) use a sample of U.S. and non-U.S. domestic funds that exclude the funds in the bottom fund size quintile (Q1). Column (3)
uses a sample of U.S. domestic funds that excludes the funds in the top fund size quintile. Column (4) uses a sample of U.S. domestic funds that
excludes the funds in the top fund size quintile with the size breakpoint given by non-U.S. funds. Column (5) uses a sample of U.S. domestic funds
that excludes the funds with size above the largest non-U.S. funds in each quarter. Columns (6) and (7) use a sample of U.S. and non-U.S. domestic
funds and include an interaction term between the fund size (TNA) and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a fund is below the median
SMB factor loading in each quarter, and zero otherwise. Columns (8) and (9) use a sample of U.S. and non-U.S. international funds. See Table A.3
in the Appendix for variables deﬁnition. Robust -statistics corrected for fund-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample Excludes Q1 Sample Excludes Largest U.S. Funds Large Cap Funds International Funds
US Non-US Excludes Excludes Excludes Max US Non-US US Non-US
Funds Funds Q5 Q5 Non-US TNA Non-US Funds Funds Funds Funds
TNA (log) -0.1071 0.0044 -0.1047 -0.0697 -0.0732 -0.0967 0.0384 0.0187 -0.0030
(-6.12) (0.30) (-5.34) (-3.39) (-5.15) (-3.69) (1.63) (0.72) (-0.25)
Family TNA (log) 0.0309 0.0073 0.0274 0.0345 0.0294 0.0358 0.0370 0.0411 0.0226
(2.72) (0.68) (2.53) (2.90) (2.87) (1.81) (2.19) (1.53) (2.03)
Large cap fund -0.3174 0.0720
(-0.52) (0.14)
TNA (log) × Large cap fund 0.0500 0.0218
(2.02) (0.83)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 47188 47434 47153 32322 57288 58957 59276 14390 97421
2 0.113 0.046 0.096 0.099 0.099 0.103 0.049 0.07 0.03
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Table 8
Robustness of Regression of Mutual Fund Performance
This table reports panel regressions of the performance of open-end actively managed domestic equity funds in 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the quarterly Carhart
model alpha (percentage per quarter) estimated using monthly fund returns in U.S. dollars. Explanatory variables include fund characteristics, country dummies, and time
dummies. Columns (1) and (6) use benchmark-adjusted returns. Columns (2) and (7) use market model alphas. Columns (3) and (8) use gross returns. Columns (4) and (9)
use Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. Columns (5) and (10) include two lags of ﬂows and performance as explanatory variables. Column (11) presents standard errors
adjusted for country-level clustering. See Table A.3 in Appendix for variables deﬁnition. Robust -statistics corrected for fund-level or country-level clustering (in column (11))
are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
US Funds Non-US Funds
Benchmark- Market Grosss Fama- Lags Benchmark- Market Gross Fama- Lags Cluster by
adjusted Model Return MacBeth adjusted Model Returns MacBeth Country
TNA (log) -0.0750 -0.1285 -0.0734 -0.0685 -0.0607 0.0171 0.0191 0.0517 0.0805 0.0767 0.0517
(-5.11) (-7.15) (-5.99) (-2.42) (-4.77) (1.57) (1.63) (4.58) (2.46) (6.14) (2.46)
Family TNA (log) 0.0242 0.0351 0.0226 0.0281 0.0186 0.0156 0.0246 0.0273 0.0286 0.0224 0.0275
(2.21) (2.56) (2.40) (1.59) (2.00) (1.48) (2.05) (2.62) (1.68) (2.09) (1.91)
Age (log) 0.0103 0.0735 0.0514 0.0050 0.0365 -0.0648 -0.0670 -0.0819 -0.1123 -0.1490 -0.0825
(0.25) (1.63) (1.64) (0.10) (1.13) (-2.19) (-2.04) (-2.62) (-1.39) (-4.41) (-1.93)
Expense ratio -0.3755 -0.3108 0.2484 -0.0978 -0.2034 -0.0891 -0.1183 0.2031 -0.0390 -0.0367 -0.0489
(-4.27) (-3.25) (3.69) (-0.72) (-2.60) (-2.32) (-3.02) (5.82) (-0.52) (-0.96) (-0.77)
Total load -0.0059 -0.0145 -0.0166 -0.0152 -0.0072 0.0059 0.0151 0.0117 0.0135 0.0109 0.0120
(-0.65) (-1.31) (-2.25) (-1.35) (-0.98) (0.63) (1.54) (1.30) (1.12) (1.11) (0.96)
Flow−1 0.0020 -0.0023 0.0021 0.0012 -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0111 0.0063 0.0072 0.0111
(1.66) (-1.91) (2.04) (0.52) (-1.29) (-0.10) (-0.17) (9.76) (1.79) (5.62) (2.17)
Flow−2 0.0030 -0.0021
(2.73) (-1.77)
Alpha−1 0.0603 0.1248 0.0650 0.0817 0.0599 0.0447 0.0004 0.0105 0.0853 0.0276 0.0105
(7.87) (21.19) (7.64) (2.39) (8.12) (6.73) (0.07) (1.58) (2.43) (3.71) (0.46)
Alpha−2 0.0568 0.0068
(8.23) (0.99)
Number of countries sold 0.2436 0.2741 0.1848 0.1515 0.1086 0.0618 0.0609 0.0079 0.0776 0.0067 0.0080
(2.73) (2.04) (2.06) (1.93) (1.41) (3.40) (3.30) (0.38) (1.02) (0.32) (0.29)
Management team -0.0346 -0.0896 -0.1631 -0.1423 -0.1181 -0.1239 -0.1304 -0.1048 -0.1246 -0.1368 -0.1027
(-0.75) (-1.55) (-4.16) (-3.16) (-3.21) (-2.48) (-2.51) (-2.41) (-1.52) (-2.88) (-1.20)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57,747 58,957 58,957 58,957 53,783 58,337 59,276 59,276 59,276 47,937 59,276
2 0.092 0.137 0.103 0.055 0.066 0.039 0.076 0.051 0.307 0.053 0.048
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Appendix
Table A.1
Top Three Domestic and International Equity Funds by Country
This table lists the top three open-end actively managed domestic and international equity funds by country. Funds are ranked by total net assets (sum of all share classes in
U.S. dollars millions) as of December 2007.
Domestic Funds International Funds
Country Fund Name TNA Fund Name TNA
($ million) ($ million)
Australia Perpetual’s W Industrial 4,525 Platinum Trust - Platinum International 8,035
Vanguard idx Fd-Vanguard Australian Shares 3,325 AXA - Wholesale Global Equity - Value 4,358
FirstChoice WI - CFS Wholesale Imputation 2,947 Vanguard idx Fd-Vanguard International Shares 4,291
Austria Pioneer Funds Austria - Austria Stock 623 Raiﬀeisen-Eurasien-AktienFonds 1,997
ESPA STOCK VIENNA EUR 249 Raiﬀeisen-Osteuropa-Aktien Fonds 1,923
3 Banken Oesterreich-Fonds 199 Raiﬀeisen-Europa-Aktien 873
Belgium Degroof Eq Belgium Active Benelux 517 Privileged Portfolio Equity Acc 2,242
Fortis B Equity Belgium 504 Petercam Equities Europe Dividend Cap 1,694
Dexia Equities B Belgium Cap 391 Degroof Equities EMU Behavioral Benelux 1,389
Canada RBC Canadian Dividend 9,723 Mac Cundill Value Series 7,576
CIBC Monthly Income 7,130 Fidelity Global Series 4,503
CI Canadian Investment 6,594 Templeton Growth Ltd 4,452
Denmark Danske Invest Danmark 699 Sparinvest Value Aktier 4,697
Nordea Invest Danmark 556 Carnegie WorldWide / Globale Aktier 1,503
BankInvest Danske Aktier 498 Jyske Invest Favorit Aktier 1,369
Finland OP-Delta 1,119 Nordea Pro Stable Return Kasvu 835
Danske Suomi Osake Tuotto 363 Nordea Maailma Kasvu 755
Aktia Capital 336 OP-Eurooppa Osake 684
France Atout France Cap 6,582 BNP Paribas Actions Euroland Dis 5,798
Tricolore Rendement Cap 5,987 Atout Euroland 5,032
Ecureuil Investissements 4,737 Magellan Cap/Dis 3,885
Germany DekaFonds 7,066 DWS Vermoegensbildungsfonds 8,189
DWS Investa 5,211 UniGlobal 6,495
UniFonds 4,594 AriDeka 5,797
India Reliance Growth Fund-Growth Plan 1,618
Reliance Diversiﬁed Power Sector Fund-Growth 1,511
HDFC Equity Fund-Growth 1,393
Indonesia Schroder Dana Prestasi Plus 1,009
Fortis Ekuitas 627
Manulife Dana Saham 319
Ireland First State China Growth 3,237
Coutts Equator UK Equity Index Prgm 3,110
First State Asian Equity Plus I 1,402
Italy Sanpaolo Azioni Italia 1,365 Ducato Geo Europa 2,659
Arca Azioni Italia 1,178 Anima Fondo Trading 1,704
Allianz Azioni Italia 980 Sanpaolo Europe 1,464
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Table A.1: continued
Domestic Funds International Funds
Country Fund Name TNA Fund Name TNA
($ million) ($ million)
Japan Fidelity Japan Growth Equity Fund 3511 Nomura Global High Income Stock Fund 2550
Sawakami Fund 2231 Nikko CS Global High Yield Stock Fund M Div 1968
Nomura Japan Equity Strategy 2211 HSBC India Open 1722
Malaysia PRUlink Equity 755
Public Ittikal 459
Public Regular Savings 315
Netherlands Centraal Beheer Achmea Nederland fonds 1502 Fortis OBAM NV 7791
ING Dutch 1134 AEGON Equity Fund 7225
ABN AMRO Netherlands NV 1068 AEGON Equity Europe Fund 5254
Norway Skagen Vekst 2132 Skagen Global 5257
Pareto Aksje Norge 1064 Skagen Kon-Tiki 3661
Odin Norge 1014 Odin Norden 1941
Poland Arka BZ WBK Akcji FIO 2209
Pioneer Akcji Polskich FIO 1935
Legg Mason Akcji FIO 1020
Portugal Santander Accoes Portugal 368 Millennium Eurocarteira 465
Millennium Accoes Portugal 237 BPI Reestructuracoes 371
Caixagest Accoes Portugal 215 BPI Europa Valor 319
Singapore Schroder Singapore Trust Class 380 PRU Dragon Peacock 1001
DWS Singapore Equity 232 PruLink China-India 860
ML Golden Singapore Growth 168 PruLink Asian Equity 811
South Korea Korea Samsung Group Install Savings Equity 3513
Mirae Asset 300mil Target Good Comp Equity 2680
Mirae Asset Solomon Equity 2651
Spain Banif Acciones Espanolas, FI 589 Bestinfond, FI 1966
BBVA Bolsa, FI 540 Santander Dividendo Europa, FI 1962
Sabadell BS Espana Dividendo, FI 507 Bestinver Internacional, FI 1495
Sweden Swedbank Robur Kapitalinvest 4927 East Capital Russian 2355
Swedbank Robur Aktiefond Pension 3052 SEB Aktiesparfond 2,204
Nordea Allemansfond Alfa 2740 East Capital Eastern European 1886
Switzerland UBS (CH) Equity Fund - Switzerland 2578 UBS (CH) Equity Fund - European Opportunity 1093
Credit Suisse Equity Swiss Blue Chips 1822 UBS (CH) Equity Fund - Emerging Asia 927
UBS (CH) Inst Fd - Eq Switzerland 1554 Swisscanto (CH) Eq Fd Continental Europe 612
Taiwan Capital Marathon Fund 595 JF (Taiwan) China Concept Fund 635
Capital High Technology Fund 429 PCA India Fund 509
Cathay Greater China Fund 416 JF (Taiwan) Asia Fund 445
Thailand SCB Dividend Stock 70/30 Long Term Equity 280
K Equity LTF 156
Aberdeen Growth 134
UK Invesco Perpetual High Income Inc 18994 Fidelity European Acc 9519
Invesco Perpetual Income Inc 13417 M&G Global Basics 5992
Jupiter Income 7957 Standard Life Inv International Trust Acc 4414
US American Growth Fund of America 193453 American EuroPaciﬁc Growth Fund 124010
American Investment Company of America 89250 American Capital World Growth & Income Fund 113908
American Washington Mutual Investors Fund 82424 American New Perspective Fund 61218
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Table A.2
Summary Statistics of Performance Benchmarks
This table reports mean and standard deviation of monthly factor returns (percentage per month) in U.S.
dollars of the Carhart model in 1997-2007.  is the excess return on the domestic market,  is the
diﬀerence in return between the small and big portfolios,  is the diﬀerence in return between the high
and low book-to-market portfolios, and  is the diﬀerence in return between last year’s winner and
loser portfolios.
Country    
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Australia 0.98 5.16 0.36 4.22 0.72 3.65 1.23 5.29
Austria 0.97 4.72 -0.44 3.47 1.49 4.07 1.43 4.42
Belgium 0.81 4.82 -0.26 2.64 0.70 2.75 0.50 5.09
Canada 1.06 5.42 0.53 4.05 0.49 4.84 2.16 5.95
Denmark 1.05 4.94 -0.27 3.68 0.64 4.54 0.51 4.81
Finland 1.63 8.95 -0.42 4.27 -0.31 7.18 0.98 6.56
France 0.94 5.18 -0.07 3.61 0.75 4.63 1.20 6.12
Germany 0.77 5.71 -0.39 3.89 0.76 4.59 1.45 7.11
India 1.85 8.55 0.57 5.16 0.80 7.84 1.48 7.17
Indonesia 0.76 14.52 -0.37 7.37 -2.13 8.98 -2.44 13.58
Ireland 0.78 5.25 -0.10 5.93 0.56 7.69 0.56 8.44
Italy 0.97 5.88 -0.15 3.52 0.70 3.40 0.75 4.91
Japan 0.03 5.69 -0.05 3.25 0.44 3.19 0.29 5.49
Malaysia 0.37 10.20 -0.58 5.03 1.05 5.53 -0.35 8.51
Netherlands 0.67 5.06 0.15 3.62 0.48 4.12 1.02 6.91
Norway 1.16 6.50 -0.19 3.99 0.24 4.81 1.43 6.47
Poland 1.18 9.30 -0.37 7.19 1.10 6.95 0.39 5.61
Portugal 0.93 5.56 -0.53 5.56 1.30 8.23 1.06 6.85
Singapore 0.59 7.30 -0.22 5.32 1.39 5.44 -0.44 7.58
South Korea 1.67 13.05 -0.32 4.89 1.06 5.75 -0.10 8.57
Spain 1.03 5.47 0.25 3.51 0.44 3.70 0.30 5.20
Sweden 0.92 6.97 -0.29 4.19 0.16 5.60 1.11 7.92
Switzerland 0.70 4.53 0.14 3.32 0.19 2.44 0.28 5.57
Taiwan 0.29 8.64 0.13 4.16 0.24 8.53 -0.04 2.71
Thailand 0.56 12.24 0.87 8.76 2.43 12.18 -0.54 6.38
UK 0.55 3.91 0.16 5.09 1.07 7.99 1.10 4.94
US 0.49 4.43 0.22 4.18 0.40 3.78 0.86 5.56
Total 0.63 4.15 0.11 2.63 0.54 2.72 0.81 4.30
54
Table A.3
Variables Deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition
Panel A: Fund Characteristics
Alpha Alpha (percentage per quarter) estimated with three-year of past monthly fund returns in U.S. dollars with several factor
models (Lipper).
TNA Total net assets in U.S. dollars millions of the fund primary share class (Lipper).
Family TNA Total net assets in U.S. dollars millions of the fund family (parent management company) equity funds to which the
fund belongs (Lipper).
Fund age Number of years since the fund launch date (Lipper).
Expense ratio Total annual expenses as a fraction of total net assets (Lipper).
Total load Sum of front-end and back-end loads (Lipper).
Flow Percentage growth in TNA (in local currency) in a quarter, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of
dividends and distributions).
Number of countries sold Number of countries where the fund is sold (Lipper).
Management team Dummy variable that equals one when the fund is managed by more than one person or by a team, and zero
otherwise (Lipper).
Large cap fund Dummy that equals one if a fund TNA is below the median SMB factor loading, and zero otherwise (Lipper).
Panel B: Country Characteristics
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita in U.S. dollars (WDI).
Internet Ratio of number of internet users to population (WDI).
Share turnover Ratio of total value of stocks traded to stock market capitalization (WDI).
Trading costs Trading costs in basis points (Global Universe Data-ElkinsMcSherry).
Common law Dummy variable that equals one when a country’s legal origin is common law, and zero otherwise (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)).
Anti-director rights Index of minority shareholder protection (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)).
Securities regulation Sum of the disclosure requirements, liability standards, and public enforcement indices (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2006)).
Mutual fund industry age Mutual fund industry age in years (Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005)).
Mutual fund industry Herﬁndahl Sum of squared market shares of parent management companies for equity funds in each country (Lipper).
Mutual fund equity/market cap. Assets under management of equity mutual funds divided by market capitalization (EFAMA and WDI).
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